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EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING

DO REAL LAWYERS USE CREAC?

I

f you ask a law student to explain how
legal analysis is organized, the chances
are good the student will respond with
something like IRAC (Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion) or CREAC (Conclusion,
Rule, Explanation of the rule, Application
BY DIANE KRAFT
of the rule, and Conclusion). Tat’s because
most legal writing textbooks teach paradigms like IRAC and CREAC as the correct way to organize legal
analysis. A few years ago, one of my students asked me if practicing
attorneys also used CREAC,1 or if the paradigm was intended just
for law students learning to write. In efect, the student was asking
if CREAC was like a set of training wheels that would be discarded
once the writer became profcient. My answer was that practicing
attorneys continue to organize analysis by CREAC—although
they may do so unconsciously—because that’s what legal analysis
usually is: applying a rule to a set of facts to reach a conclusion.
But was I right? Would an examination of briefs written on the
kinds of issues law students often analyze in legal writing classes
support my assertion that practicing attorneys still use CREAC?
Te answer is yes. Experienced lawyers do indeed use CREAC to
organize legal analyses.2

Tis shouldn’t be a surprise. An argument organized by IRAC or
CREAC is essentially using deductive reasoning, or a syllogism,
which is central to legal analysis.3
Here’s an illustration using a well-known syllogism:
“All humans are mortal” is the R (rule);4 “Socrates is a
human” is the A (application of rule to facts); and “Terefore, Socrates is mortal” is the C (conclusion).5

Organization paradigms like CREAC are “designed…to teach
students to reason as syllogistically as possible.”6 Tis doesn’t mean
that all legal arguments should adhere slavishly to CREAC, however. In the briefs I examined, which analyzed two factor-based
issues,7 the writers often used variations of CREAC in organizing their arguments. Tey followed CREAC by stating rules frst,
which were usually followed by rule explanation and rule application. When the writers deviated from strict adherence to CREAC,
it was often to include facts about the case at bar in places other
than rule application—often before the rule or between the rule
and rule explanation—and to intersperse rule explanation with rule
application. 8 Tis was perhaps to avoid “formulaic writing devoid
of the personal stories that form the confict being presented to the
court.”9 Indeed, legal writing scholars recognize the importance of
narrative in legal analysis, and stress that “[l]aw lives on narrative”10
and “lawyers persuade by telling stories.”11 Emphasizing the facts
by including them in places other than rule application can be an
efective persuasive technique, as long as it doesn’t confuse a reader
who is expecting the analysis to follow CREAC.

Moreover, CREAC isn’t the only way an argument can be organized, and sometimes isn’t the best way. Wilson Huhn has identifed
fve types of legal reasoning—textual analysis, intent, precedent,
tradition, and policy—not all of which are strictly rule-based.12
In other words, while the deductive reasoning that CREAC represents is crucial to legal analysis, “multiple legitimate forms of
legal arguments exist.”13 Terefore, efective legal analysis must
sometimes be organized in a ways quite diferent from CREAC.

When I explain CREAC to new law students, I tell them not to
think of it as training wheels, or as the only way to organize legal
analysis. Instead, I tell them to think of it as a basic white sauce,
a sauce that every beginning cook needs to master. As the cook
gains experience, she’ll continue to use this basic sauce regularly,
but will know when to add a few ingredients to better complement
a particular dish, or when to use a diferent sauce completely.14
In the same way, experienced practicing attorneys recognize that
sometimes it’s appropriate to deviate from CREAC or to use a
diferent organizational paradigm altogether. But when an efective legal argument calls for deductive reasoning, real attorneys
use CREAC.
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